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ABSTRACT  
This paper delves into damage stability legislation as it applies to passenger ships. The 
Concordia accident, like many others before it, has shaken the maritime profession once again with 
many questions being asked without being able to provide credible answers.  Old ships have been 
designed to lower standards (it is common knowledge that new ships are safer than old ships, with 
the latter comprising the majority of the population), new standards are holistic and goal-based 
offering knowledge of the standard these ships are designed to, which is not true for old ships, 
emergency response is an altogether different science in modern ships and many others. 
Notwithstanding this state of affairs, there is another more fundamental weakness in the regulations 
for damage stability, perhaps at the heart of most problems with cruise ships safety, old and new.  A 
critical review into damage stability legislation, as it applies to passenger ships, offers compelling 
evidence that cruise ship characteristics and behaviour have not been accounted for in the derivation 
of relevant damage stability rules.  As a result, the regulatory instruments for damage stability 
currently in place do not provide the right measure of damage stability for cruise ships and, even 
more worryingly, the right guidance for design improvement. This leads to a precarious situation 
where cruise ships are underrated when it comes to assigning a damage stability standard whilst 
depriving designers of appropriate legislative instruments to nurture continuous improvement. 
Documented evidence is being presented and the ensuing results and impact discussed.  
Recommendations are given for a way forward.      
Keywords: damage stability and survivability, cruise ships 
1. INTRODUCTION 
SOLAS regulations is the Bible of safety 
and like the latter, it is considered ³hoO\´ by 
many and it will take endless debates to change 
a line, even though the former has been written, 
in the best of circumstances, by naval architects 
not yet canonised. A passenger ship is a vessel 
carrying 12 or more passengers « DQG LV
involved in international trade), irrespective of 
size, shape, age, construction and condition. 
This state of affairs has served the maritime 
industry well for over a century, as it has taken 
half as long for all concerned to realise that 
current rules are becoming progressively less 
relevant and amendments have run their course. 
The Secretary General of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) Koji Sekimizu, 
realising fully this state of affairs has set 2029 
(the 100th anniversary of SOLAS) as the date 
by which a new, more relevant, SOLAS will be 
introduced.  Sadly, he is leaving in less than a 
\HDU¶V WLPHDQG WKH FKDQFH WKDW DQRWKHr Naval 
Architect will be filling his shoes is slim.  In 
the interim, we have reached the embarrassing 
situation of having to conceal knowledge on 
the fact that treating all IMO-defined 
passengers ships the same, is alienating the 
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profession when it comes to developing and 
setting standards for damage stability. It is 
FHUWDLQ WKHUH DUH PDQ\ RWKHU ³DQRPDOLHV´ LQ
SOLAS concerning all sort of different issues 
but damage stability is big enough a subject 
when it comes to passenger ships to consider it 
in isolation. More specifically, there is 
documented evidence to demonstrate that 
passenger ship damage stability rule 
development to date is based almost 100% on 
cargo ships and, more recently, on RoRo 
passenger vessels (Project HARDER, 2003). 
Whilst the difference between cargo ships and 
RoRo passenger vessels in terms of damage 
stability and survivability might be obvious, 
concerning in particular water on car deck (a 
characteristic vulnerability of RoPax), any such 
differences between cruise ships and RoPax are 
not so obvious to non-specialists. A few points 
worth mentioning here include: 
x Whilst the difference between cargo ships 
and RoRo passenger vessels in terms of 
damage stability and survivability might be 
obvious, concerning in particular water on 
car deck (a characteristic vulnerability of 
RoPax), any such differences between cruise 
ships and RoPax are not so obvious to non-
specialists. A few points worth mentioning 
here include: 
x Old cruise ships (generally with small 
metacentric height) may capsize during the 
transient phase of flooding as a result of 
multiple free surfaces (Vassalos, et al, 2006) 
whilst RoPax may capsize as a result of 
progressive flooding and water 
accumulation on the car deck. Having said 
this, legislation is focusing on new ships, 
which is also the focus in this paper.   
x As such, new Cruise ships, having very 
large metacentric height and increased 
internal layout complexity when upper 
decks are involved in the flooding process, 
face slow sinking/capsize (Papanikolaou, et 
al, 2013). RoPax are vulnerable to rapid 
capsize (NWEP, Svensen and Vassalos).   
x Moreover, in many cases, cruise ships 
capsize or sink following up-flooding. As a 
result, the time to capsize with cruise ships 
is becoming even longer; hours (with cruise 
ships) rather than minutes (with RoPax). 
x Accounting for all the above, damage 
stability/survivability, post-SOLAS 2009, 
focusses on the whole-ship concept rather 
than the ship hull (below the subdivision 
deck, as it is the case with cargo ships).  As 
such and because of the above, geometric 
modelling for damage stability calculations 
differs.  With RoPax the car deck is 
considered as part of the survivability 
studies whilst in cruise ships at least two 
additional decks are accounted for.   
x This being the case, progressive flooding in 
cruise ships (the cause for eventual sinking 
and capsize) is very much different due to 
the complexity of the internal architecture as 
compared to RoPax, for example. The whole 
emphasis on damage stability and 
survivability changes. 
x Cruise ship survivability is more affected by 
details in local geometry as these impact on 
progressive flooding whilst RoPax are 
affected by global parameter changes (e.g., 
beam, freeboard) as the design vulnerability 
to flooding refers to the car deck. 
x As a result of the above, flooding of cruise-
ships (ships with complex internal 
subdivision) is inherently uncertain; there 
are multiple paths to same end 
state/different end state from similar initial 
conditions during periods of time that are 
similarly uncertain. 
x In all research on damage stability ad 
survivability to date, leading to new 
legislation, very little effort has been 
expended on cruise ships (one experimental 
point in Project HARDER and one in 
Project GOALDS), Figures 3 and 5, 
respectively. 
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x There is, of course, one additional issue; 
perhaps the most important of all.  Cruise 
ships are knowledge intensive with 
innovation a primary ingredient for success.  
As such, they are safety critical, considering 
the thousands of people onboard some of the 
modern megaships. Therefore, from a 
societal risk perspective, cruise ships 
warrant much more attention than any other 
ship type when it comes to damage stability 
and survivability following collision / 
grounding; a contribution of some 90% to 
total risk of passenger ships.        
Because of all the above and, in particular, 
lack of understanding and hence attention on 
the damage stability of cruise ships, an 
unfathomable situation has arisen where cruise 
ship damage stability is underrated by the rules 
whilst rendering any attempts to improve 
damage stability of cruise ships futile, using 
current IMO cost-effectiveness criteria for 
decision making.  This was the overriding 
conclusion of a recently completed project on 
the damage stability of passenger ships, where 
cruise ships and RoPax have been considered 
(EMSA III Project, 2015).  
This is a precarious position for the cruise 
ship industry to be in for both the safety-
cultured and the rule-evading owners; the 
former because the current regulatory 
framework does not justify improving cruise 
ship safety, which we know cannot be right, 
and the latter because newbuildings cruise 
VKLSV FDQ HDVLO\ PHHW WKH FRPPRQ ³SDVVHQJHU
VKLSVSRRO´ UHJXODWLRQV DQGDUH UHOD[HG LQ WKLV
futility.  This situation must change. We must 
change it.  As Naval Architects, we owe it to 
the travelling public, who board these ships by 
the thousands at a time.                      
2. PROBABILISTIC CONCEPT OF SHIP 
SUBDIVISION 
2.1   Conceptual Formulation  
A direct link between the probabilistic 
concept of ship subdivision and modern 
concepts of risk estimation may simplistically 
be expressed as follows: 
  
Rc = Pc x Pw/c x Pf/w/c x Pl/f/w/c  (1) 
 
Where: 
Rc ± Collision risk 
Pc Probability of a collision event, 
dependent on loading condition, area of 
operation, geography, topology, 
bathymetry, route, traffic density, ship 
type, human factors, etc.; 
Pw/c  Probability of water ingress, conditional 
on collision event occurring (accounting 
for all the above); 
Pf/w/c Probability of failure (capsize / sinking / 
collapse), conditional on collision and 
water ingress events occurring ± 
expressed as a function of e.g., sea 
state, structural strength and time; 
Pl/f/w/c  Consequences (Probability of Loss) 
deriving from the collision event, 
conditional on all the foregoing; this 
accounts for loss of (or injury to) life, 
property damage / loss and impact to 
the environment. The former will 
depend on time to capsize and time to 
abandon ship (as determined from 
evacuation analysis ± passenger ships) 
and the latter of e.g., probabilistic oil 
outflow using relevant models of oil 
spill damages and results from known 
accidents or through analysis using 
first-principles tools. 
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 Considering the above and on the basis of 
work by (Lutzen, 2001), the relevant 
probabilities can be calculated from first-
principles (with appropriate empirical 
adjustments).  Hence, if a more specific 
analysis is warranted for a novel ship design 
concept, the probability of collision damage 
that leads to hull breaching and flooding could 
be calculated. Moreover, based on work 
reported in (Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2006) 
and (Dogliani, et al., 2004), the various terms 
in [1] could also be addressed for each 
pertinent scenario from first principles.  This 
allows for complete risk analysis of any 
damage case. 
2.2   Basic Formulation (SOLAS 2009) 
One of the fundamental assumptions of the 
probabilistic concept of ship subdivision in 
SOLAS 2009 is that the ship under 
consideration is damaged, i.e. the hull is 
assumed to be breached and there is (large 
scale) flooding.  This implies that the cause of 
the breach, the collision event and the 
circumstances leading to its occurrence are 
disregarded; hence the interest focuses on the 
conditional probability of survival.  Other 
pertinent factors, such as size of ship, number 
of persons on board, life-saving appliances 
arrangement, and so on, are directly or 
indirectly accounted for by the Required Index 
of Subdivision R. Therefore, the probability of 
ship surviving collision damage is given by the 
Attained Index of Subdivision, A, using the 
following expressions: 
 
¦¦
  
 
J
j
i
I
i
ij spwA
1 1
 . .  (2) 
 
Where,  
j =  represents the loading conditions 
(draught) under consideration  
J =  is the number of loading conditions 
considered in the calculation of the 
attained index (normally 3 draughts) 
wj   is weighting factor for each draught;  
 i represents each compartment or group 
of compartments under consideration 
for loading condition j 
I   is the set of all feasible flooding 
scenarios, comprising single 
compartments and groups of adjacent 
compartments for loading condition j; 
The sum is taken for all cases of 
flooding in which one, two, three or 
more adjacent compartments are 
involved. 
Pi is the probability that, for loading 
condition j, only the compartment(s) 
under consideration are flooded 
weighted by the probability that the 
space above a horizontal subdivision 
may not be flooded (note that¦ ip =1 
for each draught considered) 
si is the (conditional) probability of 
surviving the flooding of 
compartment(s) under consideration for 
loading condition j 
 
The summation in equation (2) covers only 
flooding scenarios for which both pi and si are 
positive (i.e., survivable scenarios, which 
contribute to the summation).  In other words, 
A is the weightHGDYHUDJH³s-IDFWRU´ZLWK³S-
IDFWRUV´EHLQJWKHZHLJKWVLH 
 
 A = )(
^
sE on I (3) 
 
The Attained Index of Subdivision, A, must 
be greater than the Required Index, R, as 
specified by the regulations, i.e.:  
 A > R (4) 
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Deriving from the above, it is further 
implied that two different ships achieving the 
same Attained Index of subdivision are equally 
safe.  The philosophy behind the probabilistic 
concept is that two different ships with the 
same index of subdivision have equal overall 
capacity to resist flooding following collision, 
although these ships may have quite different 
actual capabilities to withstanding individual 
damage scenarios (local) in addition to being 
subjected to different collision risk altogether.  
Therefore, it is this summary statistic that is the 
key. 
Having said this, there is a profound 
knowledge hidden in the basic formulation of 
the probabilistic rules for damage stability, 
especially when the targeted population is 
cruise ships, carrying thousands of people 
onboard.  In this case, given that capsize or 
sinking of any such ship will be catastrophic, 
the emphasis in the risk model shifts towards 
damage limitation rather than reducing the 
probability of such an event taking place.  
Hence, the emphasis by (Wendel, 1968) on 
Index-A alone.  This is key to understanding 
:HQGHO¶V IRUPXODWLRQ DQG WR HQVXULQJ WKDW QR
effort will be spared with e.g., large cruise 
ships to  making A as close to 1 as possible.  
Considering (1) and (3) and allowing for 
large time intervals, it is apparent that  
Pf/w/c = (1-A)          (5) 
This means that Index A is the marginal 
probability for time to capsize within certain 
time, assuming that the time being considered 
is sufficiently long for capsize to have occurred 
in the majority of cases. This is a key 
observation, as this can be used to derive the 
flooding risk contribution, as indicated in the 
following.  However, the assumption on time 
being sufficiently long is critical. 
Finally, the Required Index of Subdivision, 
5 UHSUHVHQWV WKH ³OHYHO RI VDIHW\´ DVVRFLDWHG
with collision and flooding events that is 
deemed to be acceptable by society, in the 
sense that it is derived using ships that society 
considers fit for purpose, since they are in daily 
operation.  
3. STATUTORY A-INDEX 
CALCULATION (SOLAS 2009) 
3.1   Capsize band 
Capsize band is a concept describing the 
transition of sea-states from those at which no 
capsize is observed (lower boundary) to those 
at which the probability of capsize equals unity 
(upper boundary). In simpler terms, it is a band 
outside which capsize is either unlikely to 
happen or certain. For a finite observation time, 
the probability of capsize can be approximated 
either as a sigmoid function (Tsakalakis et al, 
2010) or alternatively as a Gaussian 
distribution (Jasionowski et al, 2007). 
Significantly, it can be observed that as the 
time of observation increases the capsize band 
contracts towards its lower boundary, 
becoming a unit step function as time 
approaches infinity (Figure 1). This property is 
of major importance, particularly when the 
focus is cruise ships where the time it takes the 
vessel to capsize is normally much longer than 
the current SOLAS-based evaluation of 30 
minutes.  In this respect, HsCrit, is associated 
with the sea state at which the probability of 
capsize (Pf) is equal to 0.5, based on 30-minute 
tests. 
 
Figure 1: Capsize band as function of the 
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observation time, (Tsakalakis, 2012). 
3.2    Survival Factor-s (Projects HARDER 
and GOALDS) 
Although it is not explicitly stated in 
SOLAS, the s-factor is a measure of the 
probability of survival of a damaged ship in 
waves, namely: 
 
(6) 
Where:  ScollH Hf S  is the probability 
density distribution of sea states expected to be 
encountered during collision and  Ssurv HF  is 
the probability of survival in that sea state 
when exposed to a specific flooding case. More 
importantly, deriving from the observations 
made in 3.1 above, the probability of survival 
is in fact a conditional probability: 
 
(7) 
This yield: 
 
 
(8) 
Furthermore, it has been assumed that the 
probability of survival, Fsurv(HS) can be 
approximated by a step function centred on the 
sea state. That is, the Hscrit constitutes the 50
th 
percentile of the significant wave height the 
vessel, subjected to a particular damage 
scenario, can survive for 30 minutes (this 
corresponds to the abscissa of the inflection 
point of the sigmoid that defines the capsize 
band, obtained for t=30min).  In Project 
GOALDS, the capsize band itself was 
substituted by a step function, as outlined next: 
 
(9) 
On the basis of this, the final formulation 
becomes: 
 
(10) 
 
Where the HS crit is given as: 
 
(11) 
In essence, the approach adopted within the 
GOALDS Project is similar to that of the 
HARDER project with the main difference 
stemming from the assumption of Hscrit 
corresponding to the lower limit of the capsize 
band, thus allowing for a justified assumption 
RI YHU\ ORQJ ³LQILQLWH´ WLPH RI VXUYLYDO  
Therefore, the limiting assumption of short 
survival time, implicit in the formulation of 
HARDER has been addressed properly in 
GOALDS.  This makes the GOALDS s-factor 
formulation better suited to cruise ships than 
the current SOLAS formulation.  
Moreover, in the analysis of results 
pertaining to small and large vessels (sample 
ships in Project GOALDS), it was made 
apparent that there is a significant effect 
deriving from scale. Indeed, one of the major 
concerns related to SOLAS 2009 formulation 
for the s-factor was that it does not account for 
the ship size and that it might be inaccurate 
when applied to vessels deviating significantly 
from the size of the test vessels used in 
HARDER as basis for its derivation. In 
addition, the fact that the SOLAS 2009 s-factor 
formulation (residual GZ curve characteristics) 
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is limited to relatively small range and 
maximum GZ values fails to account for the 
contribution of watertight volume distributed 
high enough not to be "seen" by the 
formulation.  This, in essence deviates from 
normal Naval Architecture practice, previously 
expressed through the explicit demand for and 
provision of residual/effective freeboard.   
 
Accounting for the above and using a 
systematic approach based on applying Design 
of Experiments (DoE), the formulation finally 
proposed is given by the following expression 
(Cichowicz, et al. 2011): 
 
 
(12) 
And,  
   
 (13) 
 
Where AGZ E is an effective area under the 
GZ curve taken up to the heel angle 
corresponding to the submersion of the opening 
in question and VR is the residual volume 
mentioned above; fGM  is residual metacentric 
height. This formulation, by incorporating 
residual volume accounts for the effect of scale 
on one hand whist on the other incorporates a 
key feature of the cruise vessels, namely 
residual volume high up in the vessel, which is 
a key characteristic of modern cruise vessel 
design.   
The overall improvement between Projects 
HARDER (SOLAS 2009) and GOALDS, 
pertaining to RoPax, is best visualised in 
Figure 2 next.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison between predicted 
and experimental survivability results, using 
SOLAS 2009 (HARDER - Top) and (GOALDS 
- bottom) s±factor formulations.   
As indicated in the introduction, the 
formulation for the s-factor in current SOLAS 
is based almost exclusively on results of either 
RoPax or cargo ships.  The one cruise ship 
used in GOALDS provides evidence that the 
SOLAS formulation for s-factors  
(a) Does not relate to cruise ships and, this 
fact leads to another truth, namely that  
(b) Current SOLAS does not account for the 
known survival resilience of cruise ships 
Figures 3 and 4 next provide rare evidence. 
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Figure 3: Comparison between predicted and 
experimental survivability results, using 
SOLAS 2009 (HARDER) s±factor formulation 
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Figure 4: Comparison between predicted and 
experimental survivability results, using 
Project GOALDS s±factor formulation 
In this light, it is important mentioning here 
that similar to Project GOALDS, the 
formulation of the s-factors for the current 
SOLAS formulation (Project HARDER) 
contains only one survivability experiment of a 
cruise ship, which again illustrates higher 
capsize resilience (Figure 5).  The graph also 
illustrates that the s-factor in current SOLAS is, 
in fact, based on cargo ships results!  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Experimental damage survivability 
results derived to support SOLAS 2009 
(HARDER) s±factor formulation, using cargo 
ships (conventional), RoRo and 1 cruise ship 
4. DIRECT APPROACH A-INDEX 
DERIVATION 
4.1 Approval of Alternative and Equivalents 
With direct influence from regulations, and 
because of the level of effort that is still needed 
to implement Risk-Based Design (RBD) in 
full, the real inno5vation attributable to RBD is 
currently witnessed mainly at local level.  
.QRZQ DV ³$SSURYDO RI $OWHUQDWLYHV Dnd 
(TXLYDOHQWV´ 06&&LUF   -XQH
2013), it is using the principle of equivalent 
safety to consider alternative design and 
arrangements other than those supported by 
SOLAS legislation.  This has taken a more 
generalised character than initially envisaged, 
with legislative instruments currently in place 
to address Fire Safety (SOLAS II-2, Reg. 17, 
MSC/Circ.1002); Life Saving Appliances 
(SOLAS III/Reg. 38, MSC/Circ. 1238), 
Damage Stability (Ch. II-1, Re, 4) and  general 
Approval of Equivalents (MSC/Circ. 1455).  
This opens the door to using an equivalent 
approach to A-Index derivation, as reported in 
(Vassalos et al, 2008) and highlighted in the 
following. 
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4.2 Impact of Time to Capsize 
$VGLVFXVVHGHDUOLHUWKHVXUYLYDOIDFWRU³V´
is estimated based on the assumption that the 
ship capsizes within half an hour, deriving 
mainly from work on RoPax.  This, however, is 
not the case with cruise ships and it will be of 
interest to have another introspective look into 
this with the view to ascertaining the impact of 
a more prolonged time to capsize.  The time to 
capsize (tc), is a random variable, hence only 
known as a distribution determined through 
probability methods.  Moreover, it is dependent 
upon a number of parameters (e.g. flooding 
condition, sea state, damage extent) all of 
which are also random in nature. In this 
respect, accounting only for the damage case 
scenarios implicit in SOLAS 2009 (normally 
over 1,000 for a typical passenger ship) and 
considering the 3 loading conditions, also 
implicit in the rules, and some 10 sea states per 
damage case, it becomes readily obvious that 
some form of simplification and reduction will 
be meritorious.  In view of this, two lines of 
action have been pursued and two methods are 
currently available.  The first relates to the 
development of a simple (inference) model for 
estimating the time to capsize, for any given 
collision damage scenario; the second entails 
automation of the process using Monte Carlo 
sampling of the random variables and time 
domain simulation, as outlined next. 
Method 1: Univariate Geometric Distribution 
Considerable effort has been expended over 
many years to develop an analytical expression, 
which could provide an overall description of 
the character of the stochastic process of ship 
capsize when subjected to collision damage in 
a seaway, (Jasionowski, et. al, 2004, 2006, 
2008). The inference model used is based on a 
Univariate Geometric Probability (UGD) 
density distribution for time to capsize for each 
flooding scenario, where the only random 
variable being considered is the survival factor 
³V´ as defined in SOLAS.  Hence, the result 
will be subjected to the same limiting 
assumptions, inherent in the rules, e.g., 
applicable to scenarios where the time to 
capsize is short, more specifically 30 minutes 
(SAFEDOR Report, 2006).   Figure 6 presents 
a result for a typical ship at scenario level 
where using this simple inference model, it is 
possible to predict instantly the likelihood of a 
vessel to capsize within a given time in any 
given flooding scenario. 
Scenario={displ, KG, damage, Hs}
probability that vessel 
capsizes within 1 
hour if collision takes 
place
 
Figure 6: Cumulative probability function for 
time to capsize (scenario level) - Comparison 
between analytical model and numerical 
simulation results 
Considering the ease of this operation, tens 
of thousands of scenarios may be considered to 
develop pertinent distributions at ship level, see 
Figure 7. Considering all flooding scenarios of 
interest for a typical ship, the outcome is the 
marginal cumulative probability distribution 
for time to capsize, shown in Figure 7. 
  
40,000 scenarios
probability that vessel capsizes within 
3 hours if collision takes place
Probability that vessel survives for 3 
hours if collision takes place.
 
Figure 7: Cumulative marginal probability 
distribution for time to capsize  
A close examination of Figure 7 reveals the 
following noteworthy points: 
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x If a vessel did not capsize within the first 
hour post-accident, capsize is unlikely, on 
average.  
x The marginal probability distributions for 
time to capsize tends asymptotically (i.e., 
after infinite time, in principle) to values 
defined by (1-A), as indicated earlier.   
Method 2 ± Monte Carlo Simulation 
To overcome problems associated with 
³DYHUDJLQJ´ the following approach may be 
adopted instead: 
x Use of actual statistics (e.g., loading, sea 
state, damage size, survival time);  
x Account properly for physical phenomena 
of ship motion and floodwater dispersion;  
x Disclose ship attitude and behaviour as a 
function of time (including time to 
capsize);  
x Aiming to avoid DQ\ ³XQQHFHVVDU\´
conservatism and other approximations 
and potential weaknesses embedded in the 
formulation of the probabilistic rules (e.g., 
heel limitations, down flooding points, 
etc.), the random variables distributions 
comprising loading conditions, sea states 
and damage characteristics are sampled 
using Monte Carlo Sampling and each 
ensuing damage scenario is simulated 
using explicit dynamic flooding simulation 
by PROTEUS3, (Jasionowski, 2005);  
x Random variables to be considered would 
involve for collision: location, length, 
height, penetration according to the 
damage statistics adopted in the 
probabilistic rules and sea state.  The 
resolution could be as high as necessary 
(every second of each scenario) accounting 
for transient- cross- and progressive-
flooding, impact of multi-free surfaces, 
watertight and semi-watertight doors 
(relevant to cruise ships).   
 
Applications of this method indicate that 
500 scenarios would result in an absolute 
sampling error for the cumulative probability 
of time to capsize in the order of 4%-5%. 
Examples of Monte Carlo simulations setup are 
shown in Figures 8-9 for collision.  The 
coloured bars indicate collision damage cases 
with the position of the bar designating 
location at the ship, the length, damage size 
and the colour wave height from 0mÆgreen to 
4mÆred.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Monte Carlo Simulation Set up ± 
Collision 
 
Figure 8:  Monte Carlo Simulation Set up ± 
Collision (342 scenarios) ± Large Cruise Ship 
 
 
Figure 9:  Monte Carlo Simulation and post-
processing set up ± Collision (342 scenarios) ± 
Large Cruise Ship 
Typical results are shown in Figures 10 and 
11 for a RoPax and a Cruise Ship respectively 
as cumulative distribution functions of time to 
capsize. From the latter it will be seen that 
differences between the two methods of nearly 
an order of magnitude have been encountered 
and this led to renewed scrutiny of the 
probabilistic rules, as reported in (Vassalos and 
Jasionowski, 2007) that led to the EC-funded 
Project GOALDS. 
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30% of possible collision scenarios
would lead to capsize within 30 min.
14% of possible collision scenarios
would lead to capsize within 30 min.
Analytical estimates of time to 
capsize based on SOLAS 2009 s-
factor agree reasonably well with 
results from numerical simulations
 
Figure 10:  Probability Distributions of Time to 
Capsize (RoPax) ± SOLAS 2009 Vs Direct 
Approach 
4.5% of possible grounding damages
(leading to water ingress ± no windows)
will lead to capsize within 20 minutes
Analytical (SOLAS 2009)
simulations
1.2% of possible collision damages 
(leading to water ingress ± windows)
would lead to capsize within 1hour.
 
Figure 11:  Probability Distributions of Time to 
Capsize (Cruise Ship) ± SOLAS 2009 Vs 
Direct Approach 
The results shown in the above figures offer 
another piece of evidence that the s-factor in 
current SOLAS does not represent the 
survivability of cruise ships by far.  The fact 
that time to capsize for cruise ships is 
considerably longer than RoPax or indeed 
cargo ships on which the current SOLAS is 
based (i.e., half an hour) appears to have much 
larger impact on the ability to predict 
survivability of cruise ships than initially 
envisaged.  Efforts to rectify this in Project 
GOALDS by encompassing cruise ship 
characteristics in the final formulation appear 
to have improved this situation as shown in 
Figure 12, in this case with an uncertainty band 
for 99.5% probability (Qi Chen, 2013).  
However, the fact that only one data point 
related to a cruise ship was used in such 
derivation has not had as full an impact on the 
final formulation of the s-factor as focusing on 
cruise ships alone would bring.  Some new 
evidence based on the recently completed 
EMSA III project offers strong support in this 
respect.   
 
Figure 12:  Probability Distributions of Time to 
Capsize (Cruise Ship) ± GOALDS Project s-
factor Vs Direct Approach 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WAY 
FORWARD   
All the evidence available to date strongly 
suggests that the current SOLAS misrepresents 
the survivability of cruise ships.   Continuing to 
group these with RoPax is no longer workable 
and more importantly largely unjustifiable. It is 
time to address survivability of cruise ships as 
a separate group of ships from RoPax.  This 
will incentivise research to focus on these ships 
for the first time ever with the view to 
understanding the underlying characteristics 
that define survivability of cruise ships and to 
attempt to capture these in formulating and 
proposing a new s-factor for cruise ships.  
Following verification, application and 
calibration by the industry, this will lead to a 
legislative instrument, specifically for cruise 
ships, that will incentivise industry to seek 
continuous improvement and to facilitate 
designers in this quest.  This time, it has to be 
the industry that takes initiative and leadership 
to put together a Joint Industry Project to target 
and accomplish this in a relatively short time.  
This is the only way forward!  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
x The general formulation of the s-factor for 
cargo ships was adopted as the harmonised 
solution for both cargo and passenger 
ships.  This is irrational considering that 
cruise ships are vastly different to both 
types of ships on which the formulation is 
based. 
x SOLAS 2009 formulation considerably 
underestimates cruise ship survivability. 
This implies that due credit is not given to 
the damage resilience of cruise ships, 
which, in turn, affects industry image 
(ships being seen less safe than they 
actually are). 
x SOLAS 2009 formulation does not support 
best-practice design, meaning that 
potential solutions for improving cruise 
ship survivability will not be properly 
rated and hence dismissed.  Adding to this 
is the risk of alienating the designers in 
that what they know to improve 
survivability in their designs does not 
appear to be justifiable. 
x Emphasis on continuous safety 
improvement is, as a result, being hindered 
and safety culture undermined. 
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